Authored by Abstract of source article authored by ERM Initiative Faculty July 1, BP insiders may be the only people who are privy to the truth behind what actually went wrong and caused the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig in April of Other incidents include a refinery explosion inruptured pipeline in and narrowly missed platform explosion in All these accidents occurred amidst a flurry of safety violations, sparking a comment by CEO Tony Hayward in acknowledging a failure to meet standards and a promise to improve risk management.
These are external links and will open in a new window Close share panel Image caption BP said it would try to ensure the lessons learned from the spill improved deepwater drilling operations The companies involved in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill made decisions to cut costs and save time that contributed to the disaster, a US panel has concluded.
In a chapter of its final reportto be published next week, the presidential commission said the failures were "systemic" and likely to recur. BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure safety, it found.
The April blast aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig killed 11 people and caused one of the worst oil spills in history. The Macondo well, about a mile under the sea's surface, eventually leaked millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, damaging hundreds of miles of coastline before it was capped in July.
BP said in a statement that the report, like its own investigation, had found the accident was the result of multiple causes, involving multiple companies. But, it said, the company was working with regulators "to ensure the lessons learned from Macondo lead to improvements in operations and contractor services in deepwater drilling".
The opening is worthy of any British tabloid - a picture of the inferno, a core as bright as the sun, surrounded by scarlet flames and billows of black smoke By Mark MardellBBC North America editor Mardell: Failure of an industry Transocean, which owned the Deepwater Horizon rig, said that "the procedures being conducted in the final hours were crafted and directed by BP engineers and approved in advance by federal regulators".
Halliburton also said it acted at the direction of BP and was "fully indemnified" by the oil giant. The new report criticises BP, which owned the Macondo well, Transocean and Halliburton, which managed the well-sealing operation, and blames inadequate government oversight and regulation.
Specific risks the report identifies include: The report is likely to turn attention back to BP after several months in which the oil giant sought to turn the spotlight on its contractors Stephen Power and Ben Casselman, Wall Street Journal A flawed design for the cement used to seal the bottom of the well A test of that seal identified problems but was "incorrectly judged a success" The workers' failure to recognise the first signs of the impending blow-out "Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blow-out clearly saved those companies significant time and money ," the presidential panel wrote.
He said that not all the faults lay with BP, although the company did have overall responsibility. Media playback is unsupported on your device Media captionDavid Shukman with the "top hats" used by BP to help seal oil leaks "For example the lack of a proper test that was done and the cement that was used to seal the bottom of the well, that was pretty clearly the direct responsibility of Halliburton," he said.
Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure - a failure of management National Oil Spill Commission report Excerpts: BP oil spill report "What we found was very limited oversight of these various activities and decisions, that the agency responsible in the Department of the Interior was understaffed, [and] didn't have the inspectors and technical analysts who were up to the task fully.
Though it lacked subpoena power, the panel reviewed thousands of pages of documents, interviewed hundreds of witnesses, and in the autumn conducted a series of public hearings.
In a statement released on Wednesday, Bob Graham, former Florida governor and a co-chairman of the commission, said the findings showed the blow-out was avoidable. Deepwater Horizon inquiries Presidential commission January The oil spill was an avoidable disaster caused by a series of failures and blunders made by BP and its partners, including Transocean and Halliburton, and government departments assigned to regulate them, the panel concludes.
It also warns such a disaster would likely recur because of industry complacency. BP internal report September BP admits its managers on the oil rig could have prevented the catastrophe had they picked up warning signs of a breach of the cement seal at the bottom of the well, as well as unusual pressure test readings, shortly before the explosion.
But it places much of the blame on Transocean and Halliburton. Department of Justice criminal and civil probes Chemical Safety Board investigation into regulatory approaches to offshore industry Joint inquiry by the US Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management National Academy of Engineering analysis Various Congressional inquiries Risk factors In a months-long investigation, the panel found that mistakes and "failures to appreciate risk" compromised safeguards "until the blow-out was inevitable and, at the very end, uncontrollable".
BP's "fundamental mistake", the panel wrote, was failing to exercise proper caution over the job of sealing the well with cement. The conclusions run counter to industry efforts to portray the Deepwater Horizon disaster as a rare occurrence, as oil companies prod the US government to open greater areas of the US coast to oil exploration.BP failure to communicate its developed risk assessment system with the onboard leaders (BOEMRE report , pp.
– and Bea a) Failure to communicate the importance of the negative pressure test to the rig personnel (Chief Counsel’s report , . 3 (a) (b) (c) prepare and maintain a hazard, risk and vulnerability study that identifies potential emergencies and disasters that could affect all or any part of British Columbia, assess the potential impact on people or property of the emergencies and disasters referred to in paragraph (a), make recommendations to the minister respecting emergency prevention, preparedness, response and.
The explosion, 11 deaths and spill "were the result of poor risk management, last-minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response.
Our integrated risk management software includes a comprehensive matrix of solutions that will accelerate and perfect your GRC efforts.
Plus, we’ve engineered every solution with the most robust, cutting-edge technology in the industry so that you’ll always be ahead of the curve. British Petroleum legally renamed itself BP and adopted an evocative (if vague) slogan: “Beyond petroleum.” and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they.
Risk management failures were a core factor leading to last year's offshore oil well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal report released last week concluded.